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ABSTRACT  
 
Ethnic networks have been found to have a pro-trade effect in previous research. 
However, the heterogeneous effect of different ethnicities is under-studied. Drawing on 
the literature on social structure, this paper attempts to untangle the heterogeneous effect 
of ethnic networks on international trade using trade data of Thailand. We found that 
ethnic networks have a positive impact overall on trade, confirming the results of 
previous studies. However, the magnitude of the positive effect varies across different 
ethnicities along two dimensions. First, the strength of family ties in the culture of origin 
accelerates the pro-trade effect of its ethnic networks, suggesting ethnicities with 
stronger family ties have a cultural preference for trading within their own ethnic 
community. In comparison, ethnic diversity weakens the positive effect of ethnic 
networks on trade, suggesting an informational value of diverse ethnic structure in 
promoting trade between different ethnicities. Our study contributes new evidence of the 
enduring influence of social and cultural attributes on economic activities.  
 
Keywords: ethnic networks, ethnic diversity, family ties, international trade, system-
GMM. 
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Heterogeneous Impact of Ethnic Networks on International Trade of 
Thailand: The Role of Family Ties and Ethnic Diversity 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The role of culture and social networks on economic outcomes has been embraced by 
more and more economists in recent years. The enduring effects of traditions, cultural 
values, and other informal social institutions have been found to have significant 
impacts on macroeconomic outcomes, such as international trade, investment, and 
individual decision making, such as preferences for housing, education, and health care 
(see Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2006). Within this new field of research, some 
scholars have paid particular attention to the role of ethnic networks in facilitating 
international trade and investment (e.g., Bandyopadhyay, Coughlin & Wall, 2008; 
Freeman & Lindsay, 2011; Rauch & Trindade, 2002; Tong, 2005). Ethnic networks are 
found to overcome information barriers and support contractual enforcement, and 
therefore promote trade and investment across borders.  
However, one of the lacunas of prior studies is that they have tended to examine 
a single ethnic network in terms of elasticity of trade and investment flows from one 
country to a group of countries. This has masked a great deal of heterogeneity of 
network effects on trade. Recent research has empirically demonstrated this lacuna and 
called for further investigation to unravel the heterogeneous effect of ethnic networks. 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2008) examined how twenty-nine ethnic networks located in the 
US affect the trade flows between the US and the twenty-nine countries of origin. By 
removing restrictions that the network effect is the same for all ethnicities, they found 
significant heterogeneity of ethnic-network elasticity on trade. The magnitude of the 
effect of ethnic networks is much larger than earlier studies suggested, but it is important 
only for five out of the twenty-nine countries; Brazil, Colombia, Spain, Thailand, and 
Turkey. 
We carry on this line of investigation, and attempt to disentangle the factors that 
can explain the heterogeneous effect of ethnic networks on international trade. We 
advance the extant literature in four ways. First, the pro-trade effect of ethnic networks 
has mainly been examined in a few large, developed, English-speaking, high-
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immigration countries, such as the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom (e.g., 
Girma & Yu, 2002; Mundra, 2005; Wagner, Head, & Ries, 2002). In this paper, we use 
Thailand as the unique context to examine the effect of ethnic networks on trade. 
Thailand, being a developing, non-English speaking, Asian country, provides an 
interesting testing ground in the sense that it is not a major immigration country. 
Foreigners residing in Thailand may be there for reasons that differ from residents in 
large immigration countries, such as the United States. Therefore, empirical results from 
Thailand will be able to extend the generalization of previous studies regarding the 
general effect of ethnic networks on trade. Second, prior research may have a bias in 
estimating the effect of ethnic networks where the ethnic minorities are of positive value, 
but did not estimate their effect by comparing between positive ethnic networks and 
non-existent ethnic networks. We take this into account by using a qualitative dummy 
variable and a continuous variable in our regression models to assess the relative effect 
of ethnic networks. Third, we examine how social structural features of the countries of 
origin, such as their ethnic diversity and family ties, interact with the pro-trade effect of 
their ethnic networks in Thailand. This will provide insights into whether and how pro-
trade effects of ethnic networks vary across different ethnicities. Finally, we use a panel 
data set that spans about two decades to examine the trade effects of ethnic networks. 
The panel data enables us to use a recently developed system-GMM (generalized 
method of moments; GMM-SYS) method that controls for econometric issues such as 
unobserved country heterogeneity, simultaneity and endogeneity (see e.g., Blundell & 
Bond, 1998). The control of these estimation issues is very important in establishing 
causal links between ethnic networks and trade. Therefore, our data and estimation 
methods present an important improvement upon earlier studies, such as Rauch and 
Trindade (2002), which only used maximum likelihood and Tobit estimations with 
cross-sectional data for 1990 and 2000.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we review key 
literature relating to ethnic networks and trade, and develop our hypotheses. Section 3 
provides an overview of ethnic minorities in Thailand. Our empirical strategy is laid out 
in section 4. Section 5 presents our findings and discussions. Finally, section 6 
concludes.  
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2. Literature review 
 
The core of the pro-trade function of ethnic networks lies in the notion that people tend 
to associate with others who are similar to themselves in some salient respect, such as 
ethnic identification, religion, and race. Despite the rapid development of modern 
market-based and liberal societies, this in-group network effect persists (Bowles & 
Gintis, 2004; Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2009). Sociologists argue that in-group 
affinity supports cooperation by means of positive sentiments, such as ethnic purity and 
personal loyalty among group members (Loury, 2001), whereas economists believe that 
persistent network effects can be explained by their problem solving capabilities, such as 
promoting information flows among members and the enforcement of contracts (Bowles 
& Gintis, 2004). 
Prior research, theoretical as well as empirical, has identified ethnic networks as 
an important intermediary that can mitigate informal barriers in foreign country markets 
by providing information about demand, languages, business practices, and laws, as well 
as instilling confidence to facilitate international trade (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2008). For 
example, Rauch and Trindade (2002) find that ethnic Chinese networks, proxied by the 
ethnic Chinese population shares, increased bilateral trade between pairs of countries. 
The increase rate is higher for differentiated than for homogenous products, suggesting 
that business and social networks have a considerable quantitative effect on international 
trade by helping match buyers and sellers in addition to their effect through enforcement 
of community sanctions that deter opportunistic behaviour. Other studies have focused 
on trade flows between a single English speaking country, such as the US or the UK, 
and origin countries of different ethnicities, with most results confirming the positive 
trade effect of ethnic networks (Bardhan & Guhathakurta, 2004; Dunlevy, 2006). 
However, one of the lacunas of this literature is that it has either focused on a single 
ethnic network, such as the ethnic Chinese networks in Rauch and Trindade (2002), or it 
has assumed that all ethnic networks have an equal effect on trade. 
This lacuna has been empirically demonstrated by Bandyopadhyay et al. (2008) 
who found significant heterogeneity of ethnic-network elasticity on trade with the US: 
ethnic networks were important for only for five out of twenty-nine countries in their 
investigation – Brazil, Colombia, Spain, Thailand, and Turkey – but not for others. 
However, no explanation is provided for why the significant impact only exists for these 
particular countries. Dunlevy (2006) is by far the only study that has attempted to 
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disentangle the heterogeneous effect of ethnic networks. Employing export data for fifty 
US states with eighty-seven foreign countries averaged over the period 1990 to 1992, 
Dunlevy (2006) found that the trade effect of the various ethnicities is stronger when the 
origin country’s political system is more corrupt, and less important when Spanish or 
English is the language of the origin country. The interpretation for the varying effect of 
these ethnic networks is that ethnic networks are more valuable when destination 
markets are less transparent or more subject to corruption. In addition, sharing a 
common language between the import and export countries reduces the value of ethnic 
networks.  
We extend this line of investigation by focusing on some salient social aspects of 
the country of origin that may account for the heterogeneous effect of ethnic networks. 
The significant effect of social and cultural aspects on economic behaviour has been 
increasingly studied in different areas. For example, Osili and Paulson (2008) found that 
immigrants to the US from countries with poorer investment protection are more 
reluctant to buy shares, consistent with them extrapolating to the new environment that 
prevailing in their country of origin. Giuliano (2007) shows that living arrangements of 
US families are affected not only by economic conditions, but also by cultural heritage 
(for example, the structure of the family in their country of origin). Similarly, Fernandez, 
Fogli, & Olivetti (2004) and Fernandez & Fogli (2009) show that the work and fertility 
choices of second-generation American women are influenced by the female labour 
force participation and fertility rates of their parents’ country of origin. The enduring 
cultural and social forces have yet to be fully considered in international trade research.  
There are two aspects of social structure that are of interest to us. One is ethnic 
diversity. With the wide-reaching process of globalization, ethnic composition has been 
increasingly diverse across many countries. Scholars and policy makers have paid 
attention to whether the increasing cultural and ethnic diversity might threaten social 
cohesion by eroding the social fabric of society. Several empirical studies have 
documented a negative relation between ethnic diversity and generalized trust. They 
found people tend to trust each other less when they face diverse surroundings (Alesina 
& La Ferrara, 2002; Banting, Johnston, & Soroka, 2006). However, recent studies begin 
to challenge this view, and provide some evidence that such a strong negative 
association does not necessarily exist (Bahry, Kosolapov, Kozyreva, & Wilson, 2005). 
For example, Hooge, Reeskens, Stolle, & Trappers (2009) employed data across twenty 
European countries, and found that at country level ethnic diversity does not have a 
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negative association with generalized trust, hence calling into question previous 
interpretations which were based exclusively on US data. The relevance of this debate to 
trade is that if higher ethnic diversity reduces generalized trust, then ethnic networks will 
produce a greater effect on trade taking place within a certain ethnicity. However, if 
ethnic diversity does not have a definite association with generalized trust, as research 
using data from outside the US. shows, then it would have little to do with the pattern of 
trading within ethnic networks.  
While the question of whether ethnic diversity in a country reduces cross-
ethnicity trust seems unsettled, we depart from this discussion and suggest an alternative 
argument. We suggest that the ethnic diversity of the origin country can increase the 
contact between different ethnicities. More direct contacts usually help to reduce 
prejudice and hostility because such contacts reduce ignorance and stereotypes (Allport, 
1954). Direct contact and experience are also very important in fostering more positive 
attitudes across ethnicities and therefore promote more social and economic exchanges 
(Sigelman & Welch, 1993). Therefore, an ethnically diverse environment, compared 
with an ethnically homogenous one, is more capable of providing the opportunities for 
cross-ethnic contact, and exposing consumers to products from different cultures and 
traditions, thereby reducing information asymmetry between different ethnicities (Mooy 
& Robben, 1998). In addition, a more open and pluralistic regime is argued to be able to 
lay the foundation for higher levels of trust among different ethnicities, and therefore 
lessen the sole reliance on one’s own ethnic network (Radnitz, Wheatley, & Zurcher, 
2009). Taking these arguments together, an ethnically diverse environment seems to be 
able to reduce the transaction costs associated with trade across different ethnicities and 
reduce people’s sole reliance on their own ethnicity. As such, we hypothesize that: 
 
H1: Ethnic diversity of the origin country of a certain ethnicity will reduce the trade 
effect of its ethnic networks.  
 
The second aspect of social structure is family ties. Family ties are humanity’s most 
basic form of institution. Family structure may influence economic disparities or other 
forms of social or economic outcomes. However, over a long time, researchers have 
traditionally assumed that the impact of family structures tends to be lower than that of 
other institutions, such as the state, religion, or the law, if only because of their small 
size, their limited range, and their heterogeneity. However, recently, some academics 
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have noted strong patterns of family structure, with clear regional variations and 
persistence over time, and linked them to significant social and economic outcomes. For 
instance, Duranton, Rodriguez-Pose, & Sandall (2009) found family types with the 
feature of weaker personal links and more movement and mixing tend to be associated 
with service societies, and tend to have richer and more dynamic regions.  
Family ties are defined by Alesina & Giuliano (2010) as the extent to which in 
different cultures family members are closely tied together. The significance of family 
ties originates from the hypothesis first put forward by Bansfield (1958) in his study of a 
Southern Italian village. He defines “amoral familism” as a social equilibrium in which 
people trust exclusively their immediate family, expect everybody else to behave in that 
way and therefore do not trust non-family members. He argues that “amoral familism” 
leads to low civic engagement, low political participation and, low generalized trust. 
Similarly, Putnam (1993) put forward the idea that a national culture of strong family 
ties generates distrust in government, and these attitudes are extremely persistent. 
“Amoral familism” displays the extreme in the direction of strong family ties, so strong 
that they are the “only” social connection which matters.  
Empirically, researchers found that strong family ties make people rely less on 
market provided products, such as long-term insurance, as strong family networks act as 
an effective substitute (Joan, 2010). Strong family ties also reduce people’s political 
participation (Alesina & Giuliano, 2009). More importantly, Alesina & Giuliano (2009) 
demonstrate, using data from the World Value Survey (WVS) and European Social 
Survey (ESS), that such cultural traits travel with people; namely, family ties matter 
when individuals coming from different countries of origin face the same host 
institutional and economic environment. Similarly, Ermisch & Gambetta (2010) found 
that strong family ties lower the level of trust in strangers with experimental data on a 
large sample of the British population. They also identify that strong family ties reduce 
the level of people’s outward social exposure, which directly limits their experience and 
motivation to interact with those not perceived as ‘their own’. We argue that the two 
mechanisms identified in how family ties influence social trust can have a direct impact 
on how people trade with others. If “amoral familism” leads to a low level of social 
interaction, and low generalized trust in others, as research has demonstrated, people 
will rely more on their in-group networks, namely, their family, friends and those from 
same ethnicity. As such, in-ethnicity trade may be higher due to the higher level of trust 
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which can deflate transaction costs. As a result, this can accelerate the strength of the 
pro-trade effect of ethnic networks. Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
 
H2: The strength of family ties of the origin country of a certain ethnicity will increase 
the trade effect of its ethnic networks. 
 
Having stated our key hypotheses, we proceed to sketch the country background of 
Thailand in section 3, and explain our empirical strategy and data collection in section 4.  
 
3. Research background: Thailand 
Thailand is a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society in Southeast Asia, and an ASEAN 
member since 1992. More than 85% of the population speaks Thai and shares a common 
culture. Up to 12% of the population of Thailand has a significant Chinese heritage, but 
the Sino-Thai community is the best integrated in Southeast Asia. Other groups include 
the Khmer in border provinces with Cambodia; the Mon, who are substantially 
assimilated with the Thai; and the Vietnamese. Among the immigrant groups, the 
earliest arrivals were the Chinese traders and labourers. Other nationals such as Indians, 
Westerners, Japanese and people from neighbouring countries also came to Thailand for 
various reasons. The Indian merchants arrived to trade and to spread Buddhist teachings. 
The Westerners came to trade and to teach Christianity. Thailand’s neighbours, i.e., the 
Khmer, Lao, Vietnamese, Cham, Mon, Burmese, Karen, Shan and other small ethnic 
groups, immigrated to Thailand because of trade, fighting, escaping from either natural 
or manmade disasters, and the sharing of some religious traditions and culture.  
Thailand is known for its tourist attractions. However, apart from large inflow of 
tourists, the number of foreigners coming to Thailand for long stays has always been 
low, not exceeding 5,000 persons per year during 1979–1984. Most of these immigrants 
were professional transients who came to work under the Investment Promotion Act of 
1977. Most of them were from Japan, China and the US. However, since 1985, the 
number of contract workers in Thailand has increased, from 6,229 persons in 1985 to 
9,577 persons in 1990 and 22,101 in 1993. Apart from its neighbours and a few other 
major Asia countries providing the main sources of immigrants in Thailand, recent years 
have seen incremental increase of Westerners living in Thailand, as shown in data drawn 
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from the Thailand National Statistics Offices. There are no official statistics recording 
the attributes, such as age, education and profession, of these foreign residents but some 
sources suggest that the majority of Westerners stay for the long term as professionals 
(Brownlee & Mitchell, 1997). To sum up, Thailand is not a major immigration country. 
Rather it is a small, developing, Asian country with very different cultural and religious 
attributes from those Western countries that have received academic attention in this 
research area. Findings in this new setting will help extend the generalization of 
previous studies.  
 
4. Empirical model and data 
4.1. Gravity model specification  
 
We examine the effects of ethnic networks using a standard gravity model of bilateral 
trade. We examine it in two forms. First, we measure ethnic networks as a dummy 
variable to estimate the overall effect of ethnic networks. This is to examine whether the 
presence of ethnic networks generates positive impacts on trade, regardless of their 
origins. Secondly, we measure it as the natural logarithm of number of residents of a 
foreign origin plus 1, so that it is a continuous variable which will allow us to assess the 
heterogeneous effect of the scale of ethnic networks by incorporating into the model 
their two salient social features, namely, family ties and ethnic diversity. This will 
enable us to test our hypotheses and establish whether or not these social features 
magnify or deflate the effect of ethnic networks on international trade.   
The gravity model takes its name from the prediction that the volume of trade 
between two countries will be directly related to the product of their economic masses 
(Rauch & Trindade, 2002). For the purposes of comparison (with the literature) and 
robustness regarding the sign and magnitude of estimated coefficients, we employ the 
OLS, fixed effects, random effects and GMM estimation methods. The common gravity 
model that we are going to use is specified as follows:  
 
    (1)  
 
where j denotes a country and t denotes time. β is the constant term common to all 
countries; βj measures time-invariant unobservable country-specific effects; βt measures 
time-variant effects; εjt is the general disturbance term for the model, which is time-
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varying and serially uncorrelated with mean zero and variance µ2. The coefficients δ’s 
and γ’s are estimable parameters. As emphasized in Bandyopadhyay et al. (2008), the 
fixed effects and GMM specifications consider the fixed effects term βj in the 
estimations. The dependent variable is either Ln Exports or Ln Imports. 
Ln Exportsjt (Ln Imports)jt denotes (the logarithm of) the dollar value of exports 
(imports) of manufactures from (to) Thailand to (from) country j in year t. Ethnic 
Networksjt denotes whether a certain ethnicity j has a positive presence in Thailand in 
year t. Positive presence is proxied by value 1 and otherwise value 0. Or, it denotes 
natural logarithm of (1 + the total number of residents of a foreign origin j in Thailand in 
year t). GDPt  denotes GDP of Thailand in year t. GDPjt denotes GDP of a foreign origin 
j in year t. Populationt denotes population of Thailand in year t. Populationjt denotes 
population of a foreign origin j in year t. Distancejt denotes the distance from Thailand to 
the capital of foreign origin country j. Zij denotes other (k) variables used to augment 
this standard form that allows us to test the hypotheses in the previous section.  
Following the previous section, Zij includes family ties and ethnic diversity. A 
common border has been found to affect bilateral trade in previous studies (McCallum, 
1995). However, we exclude this factor as no country in our final sample borders 
Thailand. In addition, we also control for the effect of institutional environment. This is 
in line with Dunlevy (2006), in which corruption is examined as the only institutional 
factor affecting bilateral trade. Apart from corruption, we also include additional 
institutional factors such as origin of legal system, extent of marketing and English 
language as control variables. In addition, we include religious commonality (measured 
as percentage of Buddhist population) and ASEAN dummy, as they may have an 
important influence on the trading pattern of Thailand.   
 
4.2. Data and measurement 
Research data for our empirical analysis are gathered from various sources. Firstly, data 
on exports to and imports from Thailand is obtained from the UN Comtrade database. 
We use exports as our primary dependent variable. Imports are used as an alternative to 
check the robustness of our results. The time period for these dependent variables is 
between 1988 and 2006 to allow for one-period lagged effect of explanatory factors in 
the regression model, which helps mitigate the endogeneity issue (see e.g., Girma & Yu, 
2002). With regard to our explanatory variables, data on ethnic networks in Thailand 
between 1987 and 2005 are drawn from the Thailand National Statistics Offices. 
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Twenty-seven foreign ethnicities having a positive number of residents in Thailand were 
recorded throughout this period of time, these are listed in Appendix B.1 The data were 
reported in a consistent format, with the total number of foreign aliens classified by 
nationality and gender provided by Thailand National Statistics Bureau. We measure 
ethnic networks in two forms. First we measure it as a dummy variable, and secondly, 
we measure it with the natural logarithm of the total number of foreign aliens in 
Thailand plus one as a continuous variable to assess the relative trade effect of ethnic 
networks. Data on GDP, population for Thailand, and its trading partners is drawn from 
the World Bank. Distance, which is measured by the natural logarithm of kilometres 
between Bangkok and the capital city of the origin country of the immigrant ethnic 
network, is compiled by using city distance calculator.  
Ethnic diversity can be measured in two ways. First, it is measured by the 
percentage of the second largest ethnic group of population residing in a country using 
CIA country profiles data; therefore, high values indicate higher ethnic diversity. While 
this measurement has been used in many earlier studies (e.g., Alesina & La Ferrara, 
2002; Collier, 2001; Hero & Tolbert, 1996), it is acknowledged that it only uses limited 
data to portray ethnic diversity. Therefore, we adopt a second measure, following Fearon 
(2003), defined by the probability that two individuals selected at random from a 
country will be from different ethnic groups. If the population shares of the ethnic 
groups in a country are denoted by p1, p2, p3…., pn, then ethnic diversity is   
 
 
In this definition, all ethnic groups with at least one percentage point of the population 
are considered. Ethnic groups are classified based on some important social and ethnic 
features, such as having a common homeland, and sharing distinguishing cultural 
features, such as common language, religion and customs (Fearon, 2003: p. 201). This 
measurement has an advantage over the first measurement in the sense that all major 
recognizable ethnic minorities are considered so that it improves the accuracy of the 
measurement. We create an interaction variable of ethnic diversity and ethnic networks 
to test the first hypothesis. The strength of family ties is measured, following Alesina & 
                                                 
1 In addition to the twenty-three countries shown in Appendix B, we also had ethnic networks data on 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar and Nepal. However, these countries were removed from our sample as we did 
not have all the data regarding the factors listed in Table 1. 
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Giuliano (2009), by looking at the World Value Survey (WVS) variables capturing 
beliefs on the importance of the family in an individual’s life, the duties and 
responsibilities of parents and children, and the love and respect for one’s own parents. 
The WVS is a compilation of national surveys on values and norms on a wide variety of 
topics, carried out four times (1981–1984, 1990–1993, 1995–1997, and 1999–2004). 
The coverage varies depending on the wave. The 1981–84 survey covered 22 countries, 
the 1990–93 wave 42 countries, the 1995–97 wave 54 countries and, finally the last 
wave covered 81 countries. To avoid awkwardness in interpreting its results, we use the 
reciprocal value of the average score drawn from the original data so that it is measured 
in a way that higher values indicate stronger family ties. Likewise, we create another 
interaction variable of ethnic diversity and ethnic networks to test the second hypothesis.  
Data on the control of corruption is from the PRS group, a consultant company 
specializing in producing macro-economic and political related data. We use this source 
due to its offering the widest coverage of country and period. The index is based on 
seven points, with higher scores indicating better control of corruption. Most scholars 
identify two main secular legal traditions (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 
2008), which we follow to code countries with two dummy variables: one is civil law 
origin and the other is common law origin. Countries with civil law origin are coded as 1 
and otherwise 0 for the first dummy; countries with common law origin are coded as 1 
and 0 otherwise for the second dummy. The data is derived from JuriGloba Research 
Group, specializing in world legal systems, hosted by the University of Ottawa. The 
extent of marketing is included in the model to control for the effect of marketing 
expertise on trade. The data is derived from the Global Competitiveness Reports, 
published by the World Economic Forum. It is based on seven points, with higher points 
indicating that companies employ the world’s most sophisticated tools and techniques. 
We expect that countries in which companies employ sophisticated and extensive tools 
for their marketing activity would rely less on ethnic networks as an informal channel to 
promote trade. This variable has never been considered in earlier studies, but controlling 
it is important as it will account for the advance of marketing in reducing informational 
barriers in business activities. In addition, we include religious commonality and 
ASEAN dummy in the model to control for the potential effect of these two factors. 
Descriptive statistics of all variables and their definition are presented in Table 1. 
The sample size was originally 4,976 country-year observations for 197 
countries when excluding the data related to ethnic networks, family ties, ethnic 
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diversity and marketing factors. With the inclusion of these factors, our final sample 
covers 80 countries with 1,547 observations. The explanatory variables are lagged one 
period. The time period for the dependent variables is between 1988 and 2006. Except 
Family Ties and the related factors, the time period for all the explanatory variables, 
including control variables, is between 1987 and 2005. For the variable Family Ties and 
its interaction terms, the time period is between 1987 and 2004. See Appendix B for 
further details. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
5. Empirical analysis and results 
 
Our investigation takes two steps. First, we estimate the overall effect of ethnic networks 
by assigning ethnic networks as a dummy variable. This step of the analysis is deemed 
necessary because skipping this step may under-estimate the overall effect of ethnic 
networks. This analysis requires us to incorporate ethnicities that do not have presence 
in Thailand. Apart from the 27 ethnicities represented in Thailand, we include in the 
model all the major nations that do not have residence in Thailand to execute this 
estimation. The second step treats ethnic networking as a continuous variable and 
assesses its effect on trade with OLS, random and fixed effect panel estimation. It is 
noted that although the causation between social and cultural aspects and economic 
outcomes is likely to work both ways, this problem is lessened in our estimation for two 
reasons. First, we focus on the social dimensions that are intrinsically inherited rather 
than voluntarily adopted by individuals (e.g., Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, 
& Wacziarg, 2003).2 When aggregated at country level, such features are very difficult 
to change in a short span of time. That is, family ties and ethnic diversity of a certain 
ethnicity are largely a given for the ethnic group. Therefore, their effect on bilateral 
trade is understood as causal forces affecting trade. Second, we provide robustness 
checks with the recently developed system-GMM method to control for specific 
estimation difficulties, thereby strengthening the reliability and validity of our results. 
To find out whether this potential endogeneity issue is resolved by the GMM, we can 
check the relevance of moment conditions in conjunction with the tests of 
overidentifying restrictions. If the regression specifications satisfy the tests, we can then 
                                                 
2 As a socio-cultural variable, trust has several limitations. Trust is not just an inherited cultural variable. 
People can develop trust because of the quality of the legal system or as the result of strategic interactions 
(Axelrod, 1984). Trust can even be the result of optimal investment in social capital. In addition, 
measuring macro-level trust across countries is difficult. 
13 
 
infer that one cannot reject the economic and statistical significance of the estimated 
coefficients on trade determinants (e.g., ethnic networks, ethnic diversity, family ties and 
marketing), which implies that the effect is running from these factors to exports or 
imports. Before discussing the multiple regression analysis, Table 2 provides the 
correlation matrix among the dependent and explanatory variables.3 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
We report our regression results as follows. Table 3 reports our main results 
where Thailand’s exports is the dependent variable. In model 1, Ethnic Networks 1 is a 
dummy variable indicating the presence or absence of ethnic networks. It has attained a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient. Gravity related variables, such as GDP 
of Thailand, GDP of the country of origin of the ethnic networks, population of Thailand, 
and distance, all attain statistically significant and expected results. An exception is the 
population of the country of origin of the ethnic networks, which receives a statistically 
significant and negative result. Adjusted R2 is 56.3%, indicating a satisfactory model fit. 
In model 2, we replace the dummy variable of ethnic networks with its continuous 
variable, Ethnic Networks 2. It has also attained a statistically significant and positive 
result, with a lower coefficient compared to its dummy. The rest of the variables attain 
qualitatively unchanged results. In model 3 and model 4, with random effects estimation, 
the results of ethnic networks, whether measured as a dummy in Model 3, or as a 
continuous variable in Model 4, remain statistically positive and significant. Finally, in 
model 5 and model 6, with the fixed effects estimation, the results remain qualitatively 
unchanged. The results in Table 3 establish that ethnic networks have a pro-trade effect. 
In addition, the impact is larger when it is measured as a dummy than when it is 
measured as a continuous variable. This indicates that measuring it only as a continuous 
variable may have slightly underestimated its influence on trade. The fact that the 
dummy variable generated higher coefficient than the continuous variable may also 
indicate that there is a threshold level that determines whether there will be a positive 
presence of a certain ethnicity in Thailand. Overcoming that threshold has a higher 
impact on the trading relations between Thailand and the country of origin than that the 
impact generated by quantitative increase of the size of the ethnic networks in Thailand. 
                                                 
3 The (unreported) variance inflation factor (VIF) values among the explanatory variables are far below 10, 
suggesting the absence of multicollinearity problem.  
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In this regard, our result provides stronger support in asserting the pro-trade effect of 
ethnic networks.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
Table 4 reports results with interaction terms that are designed to test our first 
hypothesis. In model 1, Ethnic Networks is a statistically significant estimator, with an 
expected positive coefficient. Other gravity related variables attain qualitatively 
unchanged results from those in Table 3. We now look at the variables that are essential 
to test our hypotheses. First, the interaction term of ethnic diversity and ethnic networks 
attains a statistically significant and negative result, confirming our hypothesis regarding 
the diluting effect on ethnic diversity. The interaction term of family ties and ethnic 
networks achieved expected result as well. It is a statistically significant and positive 
estimator, suggesting that the pro-trade effect of ethnic networks is stronger in 
ethnicities with stronger family ties. Therefore, both hypotheses were confirmed by the 
results in this model.  
With regard to our control variables, control of corruption is shown to have a 
significant and positive effect on trade. The interaction variable of corruption and ethnic 
networks attains a significant result with a negative sign. This suggests that the impact 
of the pro-trade effect of ethnic networks on trade is weakened when the country of 
origin has less corruption. This result is consistent with the previous studies (e.g., 
Dunlevy, 2006) that show that the value of ethnic networks is lessened in countries with 
low levels of corruption. Civil law origin is found to have a statistically significant and 
negative impact on trade across all three estimates. In contrast, common law origin 
attains statistically significant and positive result in three estimates. This suggests that a 
common law system is more conducive to international trade whereas a civil law system 
is detrimental. This finding corroborates conventional wisdom that common law is the 
foundation to commercial economics due to its lighter regulatory burden (Djankov, La 
Porta, Lopez de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002), higher contractual flexibility (Pistor, 2006), 
and higher protection of private property (Hayek, 1960), which greatly reduces 
transaction uncertainty and improves economic efficiency (Mahoney, 2001). Marketing 
is a positive and significant estimator, and its interaction term with ethnic networks is 
statistically significant and negative. This is also consistent with our conjecture that the 
pro-trade effect of ethnic networks will be attenuated when extensive marketing 
techniques are adopted to promote trade. English language is a positive and significant 
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estimator, suggesting it has a positive effect on bilateral trade if the pair of countries 
shares English as their official language. In addition, its interaction variable with ethnic 
networks appears to be negative and significant, suggesting that the pro-trade impact of 
ethnic networks is attenuated if the pair of countries share the English language. These 
results also confirm Dunlevy’s (2006) findings. Religious commonality is not a 
statistically significant estimator, but membership of ASEAN is, with a very high 
coefficient of 1.34, making it one of the most important factors explaining bilateral trade 
flows in model 1.  
In model 2 of Table 4, we use random effects estimates. We find that the overall 
results remain qualitatively identical to and remarkably consistent with those in model 1. 
In model 3, we adopt fixed effect estimates and thus exclude time-invariant variables. 
Most remaining variables gave qualitatively identical results, especially with respect to 
the interaction term of family ties and ethnic networks. This lends more support for our 
second hypothesis.  
Now we look at the remaining three models in which we replace exports with 
imports as the dependent variable. First, we turn to model 4. We found that all control 
variables, with the sole exception of Populationt, received qualitatively identical results 
as those in model 1. The only exception, which is the population of Thailand, appears to 
be statistically insignificant, even though it is statistically significant in earlier models 
with the same positive sign. This is probably because imports to Thailand are much less 
affected by Thailand’s own population than are exports. Import is probably more 
affected by the standard of living and foreign firms’ activities in Thailand, whereas 
export is more likely to be attributed to Thailand’s population increasing its general 
product outcome. In fact this particular result persists in models 5 and 6 as well. The 
interaction terms of ethnic diversity lose statistical significance, but the negative 
coefficient remains. In contrast, the interaction term of ethnic diversity and family ties 
gave statistically significant and positive results, confirming our second hypothesis. The 
results of model 5 are almost identical to those in model 4, which means that our first 
hypothesis did not receive support, but our second one does. The results in model 6 are 
largely identical to those of model 3, lending more support to our second hypothesis. To 
sum up the results in Table 4, it provides substantial support to our second hypothesis 
regarding the accelerating effect of ethnic networks on trade for ethnicities with stronger 
family ties. However, the first hypothesis, that ethnic diversity may reduce the pro-trade 
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effect of ethnic networks, did not give a statistically significant result when we used 
import as the dependent variable.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Next, we look at Table 5 which aims to subject our analysis to system-GMM 
checking. In model 1 we use exports as the dependent variable. We found all variables 
attain satisfactory results with statistical significance and expected signs, much similar 
to those in Table 3. However, the coefficient of ethnic networks is only 0.02, a very 
marginal result in this regard. The overall model fitness is satisfactory, but with a lower 
R2 probably because it excludes a large number of important control variables. Turning 
to model 2, we first notice that the coefficient of ethnic networks improves drastically 
from 0.02 to 2.59. This seems to indicate the importance of including relevant control 
variables in the specification. We now focus our discussion on the variables for our 
hypotheses. First of all, the interaction term of ethnic diversity and ethnic networks 
received a statistically significant and negative result, confirming our first hypothesis 
that the pro-trade effect of ethnic networks is diluted by higher ethnic diversity. In fact, 
the coefficient is much larger, -0.75 in this model, than those in Table 4. This result is 
largely consistently with the result in Table 4 when exports is the dependent variable 
(models 1 and 2). The GMM estimates strengthen the support for our first hypothesis 
because the system-GMM model is econometrically more robust as this method 
accounts for unobserved country-specific effects and potential endogeneity, i.e., the 
correlation between the error term and regressors (see also Appendix A).4 Second, the 
interaction term of ethnic networks and family ties continues to be a statistically 
significant and positive estimator, confirming our second hypothesis. It is worth noting 
that the coefficient of this interaction term is extraordinarily high (3.04), nearly as high 
as that of the ASEAN variable, which has a coefficient of 3.15. In addition, to test 
whether such strengthening effect of stronger family ties is indeed due to higher trust 
among close ethnic networks, we include a triple interaction term, namely, the 
interaction term of ethnic networks, family ties, and corruption. Our rationale is that if 
the accelerating reliance on family ties in promoting bilateral trade is due to high levels 
                                                 
4 For the GMM results to be reliable and consistent, it is crucial that two diagnostics should be fulfilled. 
First, as expected, the test results in Table 5 show the presence of first-order autocorrelation and absence 
of second-order autocorrelation. Second, Sargan p-values confirm the validity of the instrument set. See, 
for instance, Blundell & Bond (1998), Cheng & Kwan (2000), Levine, Loayza, & Beck  (2000) for further 
details. The specification tests we employ for the regressions suggest that we can safely confirm the 
absence of simultaneity bias, causality and endogeneity considerations in the GMM context (Hansen, 1982; 
Newey & West, 1987). 
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of trust, then countries with lower corruption will rely less on such informal social 
networks. We indeed find some supporting evidence judged by the sign and coefficient 
of this interaction term. It is statistically insignificant, but a positive estimator. 
Compared with the interaction term of family ties and ethnic networks, 3.04, the 
coefficient of this triple interaction term is only 0.29 and it becomes an insignificant 
estimator. This means that in countries with less corruption, the strengthening effect of 
strong family ties on ethnic networks is somewhat lessened. The rest of the control 
variables all gave expected and satisfactory results.  
Turning to model 3, where we present our basic model in import as the 
dependent variable, the results are satisfactory and qualitatively unchanged from those in 
model 1. Model 4 presents another set of robustness checks with import as the 
dependent variable. We focus on the interaction term of ethnic networks and ethnic 
diversity first. This, again, gave a statistically significant and negative result, supporting 
our argument that ethnic diversity reduces the reliance on ethnic networks in promoting 
bilateral trade flows. Note, however, that the coefficient (-0.36) is just under half of that 
for exports, meaning the impact is lower for imports compared to export. Another 
interaction term between ethnic networks and family ties also gave a satisfactory result. 
It is statistically significant and positive, with a smaller coefficient of 1.26 compared 
with that in Table 4. In a similar vein, the triple interaction term of ethnic networks, 
family ties and corruption, also received a qualitatively unchanged result. To sum up the 
results of our system-GMM models in Table 5, we confirm that both of our hypotheses 
are strongly supported. In addition, the impact of ethnic networks, and the two 
interaction terms, all have a quantitatively larger effect on trade than models without the 
system-GMM specification, which indicates the importance of using this method to 
control for and address econometrical issues in making any inference.   
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has developed two hypotheses regarding how social structures, such as 
family ties and ethnic diversity, can moderate the effect of ethnic networks on trade 
between their countries of origin and Thailand. This advances our understanding on 
what constitutes the heterogeneous effects of ethnic networks on international trade. At a 
more general level, it also helps advance our knowledge on how social and cultural 
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factors can affect economic outcomes. The panel dataset we compiled and the adoption 
of an advanced estimation method have strengthened our confidence in affirming the 
causation between ethnic network, its interaction with family ties and ethnic diversity, 
and international trade. We view this as an initial step towards developing more research 
to fill the surprising gap in the economic literature on the heterogeneous effect of ethnic 
networks on international commerce.  
 
We reflect on some potential endogeneity among the key concepts in the study. 
Conceptually speaking, family ties are internally a key inherent component of culture, 
which differentiates cultures with strong family ties from those with weak family ties, 
such as Singapore versus Sweden (Ermisch & Gambetta, 2010). However, the potential 
endogeneity may arise between family ties and ethnic diversity of a society in the sense 
that societies hosting ethnicities with strong family ties tend to reject other ethnicities, 
thereby reducing ethnic diversity. On the other hand, there are extensive and significant 
factors that make ethnic diversity exogenous, such as wars, famine, and ethnic cleansing 
(Alesina et al., 2003). In addition, historically, some societies have multiple ethnicities 
because of complex geographical, historical and religious reasons, as in the case of India, 
which has over 2,000 ethnic groups. Modern institutional developments, such as rule of 
law, also ease potential reverse relationship between family ties and ethnic diversity (see 
e.g., Easterly, 2001). Policy makers all recognize the importance of integrating diverse 
ethnicities to fully reap the benefits of diversity (Dustmann, 1996). This further dilutes 
the potential linkage between family ties and ethnic diversity within the society. The 
absence of endogeneity between ethnic diversity and family ties can be seen in many 
countries where both are low, such as Sweden, or both are high, such as Thailand and 
India, meaning the endogeneity between the two is significantly alleviated by a host of 
social, historical and geographic factors. However, in the view that there is a dearth of 
theoretical work in explaining ethnic diversity (Hardwick, 2003), a systematic 
examination of the relationship between ethnic diversity and family ties certainly is 
merited in future studies.  
 
Future research can also investigate whether there is a similar effect of ethnic networks 
on international financial flows, such as foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio 
investment. It will be interesting to observe how economic forces, in the era of 
globalization, integrate with cultural and social factors in shaping economic outcomes. 
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Our findings also suggest that, contrary to the concern that ethnic diversity can erode 
social coherence, ethnic diversity in a country encourages its people to trade with other 
ethnicities and therefore may promote ethnic integration within the country. In contrast, 
family ties seem capable of promoting cross-country trade linkage, thereby accelerating 
the globalization process.   
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Appendix A 
 
Discussion of estimation procedures 
 
To provide a general comparison of different estimation procedures, consider the 
following dynamic model (t represents time and i represents individual panel unit such as 
a country).5 
 
+ + +                          (A.1)
 
Yi,t is the dependent variable. Xa and Xb are vectors of current and lagged explanatory 
variables respectively. Ψi represents time-invariant effects, and Ψt represents time-
specific effects. α0, α1, γs and δs are estimable unknown parameters. The time-varying 
disturbance term εi,t is serially uncorrelated with mean zero and variance σ2.   
 
Estimating equation (A.1) using the OLS method would produce biased coefficients 
because Ψi is unobservable and correlated with other regressors in the model (Hsiao, 
1985). As some lagged dependent variables may be correlated with country-specific 
effects, the estimated coefficients may be inconsistent. Although it is possible to 
eliminate Ψi by first-differencing, the OLS estimators would still be inefficient, since 
i,t and Yi,t-1 are correlated as a consequence of the correlation between i,t-1 and Yi,t-1. 
Furthermore, the OLS specification assumes that all explanatory variables are strictly 
exogenous, which is very unlikely to be the case in our study which models international 
trade.  
 
Anderson & Hsiao (1982) suggest an instrumental variables (IV) method to overcome 
these problems. They contend that Yi,t-2, or Yi,t-2, can be used as instrument for Yi,t-1. 
This instrument selection is relevant and valid because Yi,t-2, or Yi,t-2, is correlated with 
Yi,t-1, but not with i,t. If i,t is not serially correlated then the IV estimates will be 
consistent. However, since the IV technique neither uses all the related moment 
conditions, nor accounts for the differenced structure of the error term, the estimates are 
likely to be inefficient. 
                                                 
5 For further details the readers are suggested to see Antoniou, Guney, & Paudyal (2006), Arellano & 
Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). 
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As a remedy, Arellano & Bond (1991) suggest that GMM controls for these problems. 
GMM employs additional instruments obtained by utilizing the orthogonal conditions 
that exist between the error term (i,t) and the lagged dependent variable. Hence, GMM 
optimally exploits all the linear moment restrictions specified by the model, this being 
the main advantage of the GMM method. It is argued that E(it,it-1) in equation (A.1) is 
not necessarily zero, but E(i,t,i,t-2) should be zero as the consistency of GMM 
estimators is based on the absence of second-order correlation in differences and of first-
order correlation in levels. If we assume that the error terms are not correlated, it is 
expected that i,t is orthogonal to the history of the variables X and Y so that (Xi,t-2, Xi,t-
3,…Yi,t-2, Yi,t-3,…) can be used as valid instruments for i,t. If i,t follows an MA(1) 
process, then the instrument set will include the following Xi,t-3, Xi,t-4, …, Yi,t-3, Yi,t-4,…. 
Namely, the first valid instruments start from the third lag, not from the second lag, 
because the differenced-disturbances follow an MA(2) process. Thus, it is critical that 
there is no higher-order serial correlation to have a valid set of instruments independent 
from the residuals. We can examine this by referring to the Sargan test of over 
identifying restrictions and the autocorrelation statistics. 
 
This study adopts the two-step GMM estimators that use one-step residuals to construct 
the asymptotically optimal weighting matrix. These estimators are more efficient than 
their one-step counterparts when the disturbance terms are expected to show 
heteroscedasticity in the large sample data with long-term time spans. This specification 
can control for the correlation of errors over time, heteroscedasticity across firms, 
simultaneity, and measurement errors thanks to the utilization of the orthogonality 
conditions on the variance-covariance matrix. 
 
Consequently, it is implied that the GMM specification of the first differences (GMM-
DIF) is superior to its many alternatives. However, the GMM-DIF estimator has been 
shown to have a problem of weak instruments. It is known that first-differencing causes 
information loss across cross-section units (countries, in our case) and exacerbates 
measurement error biases. Arellano & Bover (1995) contend that the absence of 
information with respect to the parameters in the level variables causes substantial 
efficiency loss in models estimated in first differences using instruments in levels.  
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Hence, they suggest the use of instruments in first differences for equations in levels and 
instruments in levels for equations in first differences. Blundell & Bond (1998) reveal 
that this GMM-SYS estimator of Arellano & Bover (1995) has dramatic efficiency gains 
in cases where the GMM-DIF estimator performs poorly especially for short sample 
period and persistent data. Under the extended GMM-SYS method, the model is 
estimated in both levels and first differences; i.e., in stacked regressions level equations 
are simultaneously estimated using differenced lagged regressors as instruments. The 
poor performance by GMM-DIF is particularly apparent when the coefficient estimate 
on Yi,t-1 gets closer to one and the ratio of [variance(Ψi)/variance(εi,t)] increases (see 
equation (A.1)). In such cases, the coefficient on Yi,t-1 is downward-biased. In addition, 
Blundell & Bond (1998) report that when lagged first-differenced and lagged-levels 
instruments are incorporated into the instrument set, the finite sample bias can be 
alleviated considerably by using the additional moment conditions arising from level 
equations. The authors show that the instruments used by the GMM-DIF estimator 
contain little information about the endogenous variables in first differences, and lagged 
first differences are informative instruments for the endogenous variables in levels. In 
this way, other than controlling for individual heterogeneity, we can partially account for 
variations among firm-specific factors.  
 
In the OLS setting, the observations are pooled and hence no unobserved country-
specific effects are taken into consideration. The fixed effects method, on the other hand, 
does control for this problem. However, neither fixed effects nor random effects 
specifications address the issue of endogeneity or simultaneity. Therefore, GMM-SYS 
appears to be the most appropriate method to estimate dynamic equations or models 
including endogenous explanatory variables.  
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Appendix B 
 
Panel data structure 
Table A1  
Panel data structure and data availability. 
Country Ethnic Networks Time period 
Albania No 1987-2006 
Algeria No 1987-2006 
Argentina No 1987-2006 
Armenia No 1987-2006 
Australia Yes 1987-2006 
Austria No 1987-2006 
Azerbaijan No 1987-2006 
Bangladesh No 1987-2006 
Belarus No 1987-2006 
Belgium No 1987-2006 
Bosnia  No 1987-2006 
Brazil No 1987-2006 
Bulgaria No 1987-2006 
Canada Yes 1987-2006 
Chile No 1987-2006 
China Yes 1987-2006 
Colombia No 1987-2006 
Croatia No 1990-2006 
Czech Republic No 1993-2006 
Denmark Yes 1987-2006 
Dominica No 1987-2006 
Egypt No 1987-2006 
El Salvador No 1987-2006 
Estonia No 1990-2006 
Finland No 1987-2006 
France Yes 1987-2006 
Georgia No 1990-2006 
Germany Yes 1987-2006 
Greece No 1987-2006 
Hungary No 1987-2006 
Iceland No 1987-2006 
India Yes 1987-2006 
Indonesia Yes 1987-2006 
Iran No 1987-2006 
Iraq No 1987-2006 
Ireland No 1987-2006 
Italy Yes 1987-2006 
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Japan Yes 1987-2006 
Country Ethnic Networks Time period 
Jordan No 1987-2006 
Kyrgyzstan No 1990-2006 
Latvia No 1990-2006 
Lithuania No 1990-2006 
Luxembourg No 1990-2006 
Macedonia No 1990-2006 
Malta No 1987-2006 
Mexico No 1987-2006 
Moldova No 1990-2006 
Morocco No 1987-2006 
Netherlands Yes 1987-2006 
New Zealand Yes 1987-2006 
Nigeria No 1987-2006 
Norway Yes 1987-2006 
Pakistan Yes 1987-2006 
Peru No 1987-2006 
Philippines Yes 1987-2006 
Poland No 1987-2006 
Portugal Yes 1987-2006 
Romania No 1987-2006 
Russia No 1990-2006 
Saudi Arabia No 1987-2006 
Serbia No 1990-2006 
Singapore Yes 1987-2006 
Slovakia No 1993-2006 
Slovenia No 1990-2006 
South Africa No 1987-2006 
South Korea Yes 1987-2006 
Spain No 1987-2006 
Sweden Yes 1987-2006 
Switzerland Yes 1987-2006 
Taiwan No 1989-2006 
Tanzania No 1987-2006 
Turkey No 1987-2006 
Uganda No 1987-2006 
Ukraine No 1990-2006 
United Kingdom Yes 1987-2006 
Uruguay No 1987-2006 
USA Yes 1987-2006 
Venezuela No 1987-2006 
Viet Nam Yes 1987-2006 
Zimbabwe No 1987-2006 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for the main variables and their definition. 
  Mean SD  Min. Max. 
Ln Exports The natural logarithm of the dollar value of exports 31.403 2.814 21.708 37.517 
Ln Imports The natural logarithm of the dollar value of imports 31.116 3.012 20.052 37.799 
Ethnic 
Networks 1 1, if positive ethnic networks exist; 0, otherwise 0.587 0.493 0.000 1.000 
Ethnic 
Networks 2 
The natural logarithm of (1+ the total number of foreign 
aliens) 1.974 3.258 0.000 12.484 
GDPt 
The natural logarithm of GDP of Thailand, $ US (current 
prices, billion) 25.526 0.359 24.646 28.319 
GDPjt 
The natural logarithm of GDP of the trading partner ,$ US 
(current prices) 24.838 2.035 18.498 30.587 
Populationt The natural logarithm of Thailand’s population 17.921 0.057 17.810 18.013 
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Populationjt The natural logarithm of the trading country’s population 16.569 1.711 11.166 20.997 
Distance The natural logarithm of the distance between Bangkok and the capital city of the country (kilometres) 8.940 0.575 6.896 9.889 
Family Ties The reciprocal value of average score of three questions shown in the notes below 1.216 0.101 1.026 1.503 
Ethnic 
Diversity 
The probability that two individuals selected at random 
from a country will be from different ethnic groups 0.377 0.232 0.004 0.953 
Control of 
Corruption Score 1-7. Higher values indicate lower corruption 3.381 1.453 0.000 6.000 
Civil Law 1, if civil law; zero, otherwise 0.617 0.486 0.000 1.000 
Common Law 1, if common law; zero, otherwise 0.090 0.286 0.000 1.000 
Extent of 
marketing 
Score 1-7. Higher values indicate companies use extensive 
and employs the world’s most sophisticated tools and 
techniques 
4.471 0.938 1.000 6.700 
English 
Language 1, if English is the official language; 0, otherwise 0.205 0.404 0.000 1.000 
Religion Religious commonality with Thailand (percentage of Buddhist population) 0.062 2.416 0.000 95.500 
ASEAN 1, if the country is the ASEAN member; 0, otherwise 0.046 0.210 0.000 1.000 
We measured three family-ties factors out of 267,870 responses. Family Ties Question 1: How important it is family in your 
life? 1= very important; 2 = rather important; 3= not very important; 4 = not at all important. Family Ties Question 2: Do you 
always respect and love your parents? 1 =always; 2= earned; 3= neither. Family Ties Question 3: Parents' responsibility to their 
children? 1= do their best for their children; 2= parents have a life; 3 = neither. Family Ties is the inverse of average score of 
these three questions. For marketing and family-ties variables, if data were available for one of the waves, the other waves’ 
missing data were replaced by the mean values to mitigate data loss. The sample covers 80 countries with 1,547 observations. 
Table 2 
 Correlation matrix for the main variables. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1.Ln Exports          
2.Ln Imports 0.83**         
3.Ethnic Networks 1 0.18** 0.15**        
4.Ethnic Networks 2 0.58** 0.59** 0.51**       
5. GDPt 0.19** 0.11** 0.05* -0.08**      
6.GDPjt 0.80** 0.79** 0.14** 0.53** 0.05*     
7. Populationt 0.22** 0.10** 0.03 -0.07** 0.77** 0.09**    
8. Populationjt 0.52** 0.54** -0.04* 0.41** 0.00 0.66** 0.00   
9.Distance -0.25** -0.17** -0.28** -0.35** -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.27**  
10.Family Ties 0.19** 0.21** 0.35** 0.24** 0.02 0.28** 0.02 -0.16** 0.08** 
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11.Ethnic Diversity -0.17** -0.19** -0.18** -0.26** 0.01 -0.23** 0.02 0.05* 0.10** 
12. Control of Corruption 0.31** 0.35** 0.14** 0.31** -0.11** 0.34** -0.23** -0.20** 0.23** 
13.Civil Law -0.34** -0.24** 0.13** -0.25** 0.04* -0.10** 0.03 -0.29** 0.34** 
14.Common Law 0.21** 0.19** 0.17** 0.25** -0.02 0.15** -0.01 -0.09** 0.21** 
15.Marketing 0.60** 0.59** 0.22** 0.42** -0.03 0.64** -0.02 0.07** 0.22** 
16.English Language 0.15** 0.15** -0.03 0.20** -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.07** -0.01 
17. Religion 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.04* 0.00 -0.05* 
18. ASEAN 0.25** 0.23** 0.18** 0.30** 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.13** -0.57** 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)  
11.Ethnic Diversity -0.37**         
12.Control of Corruption 0.54** -0.30**        
13.Civil Law 0.37** -0.26** 0.10**       
14.Common Law 0.06** -0.01 0.29** -0.40**      
15.Marketing 0.40** -0.20** 0.65** -0.05* 0.38**     
16.English Language -0.19** 0.25** 0.18** -0.58** 0.62** 0.26**    
17. Religion 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.01   
18. ASEAN -0.25** 0.03 -0.11** -0.20** -0.07** -0.01 0.19** -0.01  
* (**) indicates correlation is significant at the 0.05(0.01) level (two-tailed, Pearson).  
Table 3 
The effect of ethnic networks on Thai exports (parsimonious model). 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 OLS OLS RE RE FE FE 
Ethnic Networks 1 0.28 (0.07)*** 
- 0.29 
(0.03)** -
 0.25 
(0.07)** 
- 
Ethnic Networks 2 - 0.13 (0.02)*** - 
0.16 
(0.06)** 
- 0.22 
(0.10)** 
GDPt 
0.61 
(0.15)*** 
0.57 
(0.16)*** 
0.59 
(0.06)*** 
0.54 
(0.17)*** 
0.68 
(0.16)*** 
0.59 
(0.14)*** 
GDPjt 
0.85 
(0.04)*** 
0.84 
(0.05)*** 
0.79 
(0.12)*** 
0.79 
(0.07)*** 
0.73 
(0.15)*** 
0.61 
(0.13)*** 
Populationt 
6.51 
(2.43)*** 
6.53 
(2.44)*** 
7.14 
(2.76)*** 
6.79 
(2.30)*** 
6.88 
(1.05)*** 
7.58 
(1.13)*** 
Populationjt 
-0.30 
(0.06)*** 
-0.35 
(0.05)*** 
-0.38 
(0.06)*** 
-0.41 
(0.08)*** 
-0.22 
(0.13)* 
-0.16 
(0.07)** 
Distance -0.87 (0.08)*** 
-0.86 
(0.06)*** 
-0.73 
(0.19)*** 
-0.73 
(0.17)*** 
- - 
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Model summary        
F-statistic  821.34*** 834.77*** 1005.34*** 1010.71*** 88.51*** 87.56*** 
Adjusted R2 0.5628 0.5672 0.6217 0.6251 0.3693 0.3606 
Observations 1547 1547 1547 1547 1547 1547 
Year effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The dependent variable is Ln Exports. The standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. (*), (**) and 
(***) indicates that the coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. RE is 
random effects; FE is fixed effects. Distance is dropped from FE estimations. 
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Table 4 
The effect of ethnic networks on Thai exports and imports. 
 Dependent variable: Ln Exports Dependent variable: Ln Imports 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 OLS RE FE OLS RE FE 
Ethnic Networks  0.51 (0.12)*** 
0.52 
(0.18)*** 
0.50 
(0.24)** 
0.35 
(0.11)** 
0.31 
(0.15)** 
0.54 
(0.23)** 
GDPt 
0.65 
(0.18)*** 
0.53 
(0.12)*** 
0.76 
(0.14)*** 
0.86 
(0.16)*** 
0.84 
(0.23)*** 
0.99 
(0.20)*** 
GDPjt 
0.70 
(0.06)*** 
0.74 
(0.12)*** 
0.69 
(0.12)*** 
0.55 
(0.08)*** 
0.28 
(0.13)** 
0.57 
(0.09)*** 
Populationt 
6.36 
(1.23)*** 
7.22 
(1.13)*** 
7.06 
(1.15)*** 
1.48 
(1.25) 
2.91 
(1.98) 
1.23 
(1.27) 
Populationjt 
0.13 
(0.06)** 
0.23 
(0.10)** 
-0.19 
(0.45) 
0.44 
(0.06)*** 
0.83 
(0.21)*** 
-0.29 
(0.17)* 
Distance -0.97 (0.09)*** 
-0.46 
(0.20)** - 
-0.27 
(0.10)** 
-0.35 
(0.15)** - 
Ethnic Diversity 0.39 (0.17)** 
0.64 
(0.29)** - 
0.63 
(0.20)*** 
1.73 
(0.68)** - 
Ethnic Diversity*Ethnic 
Networks 
-0.24 
(0.05)*** 
-0.12 
(0.05)** - 
-0.07 
(0.08) 
-0.32 
(0.48) - 
Family Ties  1.13 (0.50)** 
4.81 
(1.30)*** 
0.07 
(0.09) 
1.71 
(0.64)*** 
6.33 
(1.87)*** 
0.19 
(0.26) 
Family Ties*Ethnic Networks 0.38 (0.10)*** 
0.46 
(0.15)*** 
0.53 
(0.13)*** 
0.20 
(0.11)* 
0.23 
(0.10)** 
0.45 
(0.20)** 
Control of Corruption 0.16 (0.04)*** 
0.07 
(0.04)* 
1.49 
(0.71)** 
0.36 
(0.04)*** 
0.15 
(0.06)** 
0.47 
(0.73) 
Control of Corruption*Ethnic 
Networks 
-0.06 
(0.03)** 
-0.02 
(0.01)** 
-0.26 
(0.08)*** 
-0.09 
(0.03)*** 
-0.02 
(0.01)** 
-0.36 
(0.17)** 
Civil Law -1.57 (0.09)*** 
-1.74 
(0.35)*** - 
-0.55 
(0.10)*** 
-0.50 
(0.13)*** - 
Common Law 0.42 (0.14)*** 
0.45 
(0.20)** - 
0.35 
(0.14)** 
0.44 
(0.19)** - 
Marketing 0.70 (0.08)*** 
0.34 
(0.10)*** 
0.22 
(0.05)*** 
0.51 
(0.10)*** 
0.37 
(0.10)*** 
0.24 
(0.06)*** 
Marketing* Ethnic Networks -0.06 (0.03)** 
-0.06 
(0.02)*** 
-0.07 
(0.01)*** 
-0.06 
(0.03)** 
-0.02 
(0.01)** 
-0.15 
(0.03)*** 
English Language 0.77 (0.14)*** 
0.49 
(0.27)* - 
0.19 
(0.10)* 
0.75 
(0.41)* - 
English Language*Ethnic 
Networks 
-0.07 
(0.02)*** 
-0.12 
(0.05)** - 
-0.11 
(0.02)*** 
-0.03 
(0.01)*** - 
Religion 0.05 (0.09) 
0.09 
(0.11) - 
0.19 
(0.22) 
0.07 
(0.06) - 
ASEAN 1.34 (0.14)*** 
2.34 
(0.31)*** 
2.58 
(0.16)*** 
2.33 
(0.24)*** 
2.24 
(0.43)*** 
3.07 
(0.39)*** 
Model summary        
F-statistic 485.45*** 2781.62*** 73.71*** 350.72*** 3718.57*** 72.89*** 
Adjusted R2 0.7874 0.8097 0.5843 0.6816 0.7318 0.5821 
Observations 1467 1467 1467 1467 1467 1467 
Year effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The dependent variable is Ln Exports or Ln Imports. Ethnic Networks is measured by the continuous variable Ethnic Networks 2. The 
standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. (*), (**) and (***) indicates that the coefficients are 
significant or the relevant null is rejected at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. The number of observations reduces from 1547 
to 1467 because the data on family ties end in 2004, rather than in 2005. 
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Table 5 
 The effect of ethnic networks on Thai exports and imports: system-GMM estimates. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Ln Exports Ln Exports Ln Imports Ln Imports 
Ethnic Networks  0.02 (0.01)** 
2.59 
(1.16)** 
0.02 
(0.01)** 
2.45 
(1.04)** 
GDPt 
0.17 
(0.06)** 
0.19 
(0.08)** 
0.38 
(0.13)*** 
0.76 
(0.21)*** 
GDPjt 
1.25 
(0.09)*** 
1.04 
(0.17)*** 
1.47 
(0.08)*** 
0.55 
(0.18)*** 
Populationt 
5.12 
(1.53)*** 
6.74 
(1.63)*** 
1.19 
(1.54) 
2.20 
(1.71) 
Populationjt 
-0.48 
(0.08)*** 
0.25 
(0.48) 
-0.57 
(0.12)*** 
0.49 
(0.51) 
Distance -1.85 (0.20)*** 
-0.71 
(0.43)* 
-1.68 
(0.27)*** 
-0.80 
(0.39)** 
Ethnic Diversity - 0.39 (2.80) - 
4.50 
(2.04)** 
Ethnic Diversity*Ethnic Networks - -0.75 (0.32)** - 
-0.36 
(0.17)** 
Family Ties  - 4.51 (2.63)* - 
4.75 
(2.15)** 
Family Ties*Ethnic Networks - 3.04 (1.36)** - 
1.26 
(0.59)** 
Control of Corruption - 0.74 (0.33)** - 
0.25 
(0.19) 
Control of Corruption*Ethnic Networks - -0.33 (0.14)** - 
-0.41 
(0.18)** 
Control of Corruption*Family Ties* Ethnic 
Networks - 
0.29 
(0.36) - 
0.37 
(0.38) 
Civil Law - -1.26 (0.60)** - 
-1.80 
(0.55)*** 
Common Law - 1.63 (0.68)** - 
0.43 
(0.20)** 
Marketing - 0.17 (0.08)** - 
0.19 
(0.05)*** 
Marketing* Ethnic Networks - -0.02 (0.01)** - 
-0.06 
(0.03)** 
English Language - 0.84 (1.28) - 
1.50 
(2.53) 
English Language*Ethnic Networks - -0.16 (0.07)** - 
-0.20 
(0.08)** 
Religion - 0.54 (1.29) - 
1.09 
(1.14) 
ASEAN - 3.15 (0.97)*** - 
3.61 
(1.10)*** 
Model summary     
Wald-statistic 1122.43*** 728.37*** 933.82*** 743.28*** 
Adjusted R2 0.5447 0.5987 0.4326 0.5247 
Correlation 1 -6.902*** -4.048*** -7.254*** -3.406*** 
Correlation 2 -1.002 -0.6003 -1.014 -1.323 
Sargan Test (p-value) 26.40(0.84) 74.63(0.71) 26.79(0.83)  71.12(0.75) 
Observations 1547 1467 1547 1467 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The dependent variable is Ln Exports or Ln Imports. Ethnic Networks is Ethnic Networks 2. The standard errors robust to 
heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. Wald statistic tests the joint significance of estimated coefficients; 
asymptotically distributed as χ2(df) under the null of no relationship. Correlation 1 and Correlation 2 are the first and second 
order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. Sargan Test is the test of over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(df) under the null of 
instruments' validity. We tested for the potential endogeneity of the variables using the ‘Difference-in-Sargan-Hansen" 
statistic, for which the null hypothesis states that the variable is exogenous. The results show that Ethnic Networks, Ethnic 
Diversity, Family Ties, Marketing and the corresponding interaction terms should be treated as endogenous. (*), (**) and 
(***) indicates that the coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
